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We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one
of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents
cannot communicate with each other, but try to guess the choice others will make, based only the
past history of number of people choosing the two alternatives. We describe a simple probabilistic
strategy using which the agents acting independently, can still maximize the average number of
people benefitting every day. The strategy leads to a very efficient utilization of resources, and the
average deviation from the maximum possible can be made O(Nǫ), for any ǫ > 0. We also show
that a single agent does not expect to gain by not following the strategy.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minority Game(MG) is a particular version of
the El Farol Bar problem. The latter was introduced
by Brian Arthur as a prototypical model for the com-
plex emergent behavior in a system of many interacting
agents having only incomplete information, and bounded
rationality [1]. This problem is about N agents, who
have to repeatedly make choices between two alterna-
tives, and the winners are those who selected the alter-
native chosen by fewer agents. MG has been studied a
lot as a mathematical model of learning, adaptation, and
co-evolution of agents [2, 3]. An overview and bibliog-
raphy may be found in [4–6]. The interesting feature of
the minority game is that the agents seem to be able to
coordinate their actions, without any direct communica-
tion with each other, and the system can self-organize
to a state in which the fluctuations in the steady state
are much less than what would be expected if each agent
made a random choice. This is called the efficiency of the
markets.
In a system of N interacting agents, with N odd, the
degree of efficiency of the system may be measured by
how close is the average number of happy agents in the
steady state to the maximum possible value (N − 1)/2.
Simulations of MG have shown that typically the differ-
ence is of orderN1/2. The coefficient of the N1/2 depends
on details of the model, like how far back in the past the
agents look to decide their action, but it can be much
less than the value for agents making random choices.
The minimum value of the coefficient attained in several
variants of the MG is about 1/10 [5].
A variation of the minority game, focussing on the effi-
cient utilization of resources was studied by Chakrabarti
et al as the Kolkata Paise Restaurant problem [7–9]. In
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this variation, there are N restaurants, and N agents,
and there is rank order amongst the restaurants. Each
restaurant can take only one agent per day, and agents
prefer to go to a higher ranked restaurant. In spite of this
complication, it was found that an egalitarian probabilis-
tic strategy exists in which the agents visit restaurants
in a cyclic order. Also, the agents can reach this cyclic
state in a short time.
In this paper, we describe a probabilistic strategy, in-
spired by the strategy suggested in [9], for the minority
games, that is very simple, but is more efficient than
those previously studied in literature. In this strategy,
the average deviation of the number of people in the mi-
nority from the maximum (N − 1)/2 can be reduced to
be of order N ǫ, for any ǫ > 0, and the time required to
reach this level increases with N only as log logN . In
addition, we show that a game where all agents follow
this strategy, is stable against individual cheaters.
Our strategy is an application of the general win-stay-
lose-shift strategy [10], an adaptation of which to MG
was discussed earlier by Reents et al [11]. In the latter,
the deviation from best possible can be made of order
1, but the time required grows as N1/2. We are able
to get a much faster approach to optimum by using a
shift probability that depends on the current distance
from optimum. Other probabilistic strategies for minor-
ity games have also been discussed in literature [12–14],
and in some cases, it has been noted that, they can per-
form better than the deterministic ones [15]. While our
strategy seems more or less obvious, we did not find it
discussed in the literature so far, and it seems worthwhile
to study it quantitatively.
The plan of the paper is as follows: in section II, we
define the rules of the game precisely and argue that the
strategy defined leads to a very efficient use of resources.
In section III, we show that individual agents have no
incentive to cheat, if every body else follows the same
strategy. Section IV contains the results of our simu-
lations of the model, and V contains some concluding
remarks.
2II. DEFINITION OF THE MODEL
The model we consider is a variation of the El Farol
Bar problem. We consider a small city with exactly two
restaurants. There areN people in the city, called agents,
each of whom goes for dinner every evening to one of
the two restaurants. The prices and quality of food is
quite similar in both, and the only thing that governs
the choice of agents about which restaurant they go to
on a particular day is that the quality of service is worse if
the restaurant is crowded. We assume that N is odd, and
write N = 2M +1. The restaurant is said to be crowded
on a particular day, if the number of people turning up
to eat there that day exceeds M . An agent is happy if he
goes to a restaurant that is uncrowded, and will be said
to have a payoff 1. He turns up at a crowded restaurant,
his payoff is 0. Once the choice of which restaurant to go
to is made, an agent cannot change it for that day.
The agents can not communicate with each other in
any way directly in deciding which restaurant to go to.
However, each of them has available to him/her the entire
earlier history of how many people chose to go to the first
restaurant (call it A), on any earlier day. Let us denote
the number of agents turning up at A on the t−th day
by M −∆(t). Then the number of agents turning up at
the Restaurant B are M +∆(t) + 1. At the end of day t,
the value of ∆(t) is made public, and is known to all the
agents. Using the information {∆(t′)}, for t′ = 1, 2...t,
the agents try to guess the choice that other customers
who share the same public knowledge will make, and de-
cide which restaurant to go to on the day (t+1), and try
to optimize their payoff.
In the standard MG, the public information is not the
value of ∆(t), but only whether it was negative or not
[2, 3]. [ In contrast, in our model, the agents have better
quality of information, and this difference is important.]
Also, in MG each agent has a finite set of strategies avail-
able to him/her, which uses only the history {∆(t)} for
m previous days, where m is a fixed non-negative inte-
ger. Each strategy is deterministic: for a given history,
it tells which restaurant agent should go to. While the
agent has more than one strategy available to him/her,
he chooses the strategy that has the best ‘performance
score’ in the recent past. There is no probabilistic com-
ponent in the choice of any agent. For a given history,
the future choices of all agents for all subsequent days
are fully determined.
In the problem we study here, we allow agents to have
probabilistic strategies. For a given history {∆(t)}, a
strategy will specify a probability p with which he should
go to restaurant A. Another important difference from
the MG’s is that we allow the strategy to depend ex-
plicitly on the payoffs received in the m previous days.
In MG, the strategy does not explicitly involve previous
payoffs. The payoff only affect the outcome indirectly,
through the performance scores that determine which
strategy is used by the agent.
The simplest case corresponds to m = 0. In this case,
an agent has no information. His probabilistic strategy
is to make a random choice of which restaurant to go to,
with equal probability. In this case, the probability that
r people show up at Restaurant A is clearly, is
Prob(r) =
(
N
r
)
2−N (1)
The expectation value of r is N/2, and for large N , the
distribution is nearly gaussian, with a width proportional
to
√
N . We can measure the inefficiency of the system
by a parameter η defined as
η = lim
N→∞
4
N
〈(r −N/2)2〉 (2)
where 〈 〉 denotes averaging over a long time evolution,
and over different initial conditions.
The normalization has been chosen, so that the ineffi-
ciency parameter η of the system with agents using his
/her choice randomly is 1.
We now describe a simplem = 1 probabilistic strategy,
that gives a highly efficient system, where inefficiency
parameter can be made of order (1/N1−ǫ), for any ǫ > 0.
The strategy is defined as follows: At t = 0, each agent
chooses one of the two restaurants with probability 1/2
each, independently of others. At any subsequent time
t + 1, each agent follows the same simple strategy : If
at time t, he found himself in the minority, he chooses
the same restaurant as at time t. If he found himself in
the majority, and the number of people visiting the same
restaurant as him was M +∆(t) + 1, with ∆(t) ≥ 0, he
changes his choice with a small probability p, and sticks
to earlier choice with probability 1 − p, independent of
other agents. The value of p depends only on ∆(t). It
is approximately equal to ∆/M for ∆ > 0. The precise
dependence of p on ∆ is discussed later in the paper.
For large M , the number of people changing their
choice is distributed according to the Poisson distribu-
tion, with mean approximately equal to ∆, and width
varying as
√
∆(t). Thus we have the approximate recur-
sion ∆(t + 1) ≈
√
∆(t), for ∆(t) ≫ 1. This shows that
within a time of order log logN , the magnitude of ∆ will
become of O(1), and then remain of order 1.
III. STABILITY AGAINST INDIVIDUAL
CHEATERS
In the previous section, we have shown that if all the
agents follow the proposed common strategy, the social
inefficiency of the system is considerably reduced. How-
ever, selfish agents may not do what is expected of them
for social good, and act differently, if it gives them profit.
In this section, we show that if all the other people are
following the common strategy outlined above, there is a
specially selected value of p, for each ∆ > 0, such that if
the other agents follow the strategy with this value of p,
a single individual gains no advantage by cheating.
3The emergence of effective cooperation amongst selfish
agents in our problem may seem rather paradoxical at
first. After all, the main point of MG is that agents gain
by differentiating, and not following the same strategy.
If rational agents know that they cannot improve their
immediate individual gain by cheating, they would then
try to maximize their individual long-term payoff. This
they can do, if they follow the same common strategy.
This cooperative strategy is beneficial for everybody in the
long run, and deviating from it has no advantage. This is
the reason for the emergent cooperation between agents
in our model.
Let us consider any particular day t. Let the number of
people who showed up in the restaurant A be M −∆(t).
We may assume ∆(t) ≥ 0 , without loss of generality.
We consider first the case ∆ > 0. We consider a par-
ticular agent Alice, who went to A on the t-th day, and
found herself in the happy situation of being in the mi-
nority. Alice assumes that all other agents follow the
strategy. Then, all other agents who went to A will go
to it again on day (t+ 1). There are M +∆ + 1 agents
that went to B. Each of these agents will change his/her
choice with probability p. Let r be the number of agents
that actually change their choice at time (t + 1). Then,
r is a random variable, with a distribution given by
Probp(r) =
(
M +∆+ 1
r
)
pr(1− p)M+∆+1−r (3)
For M ≫ 1, this distribution tends to the Poisson
distribution with parameter λ = p(M + ∆ + 1), given
by
Probλ(r) = λ
re−λ/r! (4)
If Alice chooses to go to A the next day, she will be
in the winning position, if r ≤ ∆. Hence her expected
payoff EP (Alice|stay), if she chooses to stay with her
present choice is
EP (Alice|stay) =
∆∑
r=0
Probp(r) (5)
If, on the other hand, Alice would switch her choice,
she would win if r ≥ ∆+2. Hence, we have her expected
payoff EP (Alice|switch) if she chooses to switch, given
by
EP (Alice|switch) =
∞∑
r=∆+2
Probp(r) (6)
For Alice to have no incentive to cheat, we must have
EP (Alice|stay) ≥ EP (Alice|switch). (7)
Now consider the agent Bob, who went to B on day
t. He also assumes that all other people will follow the
strategy: those who went to A will stick to their choice,
and those who went to B switch their choice with proba-
bility p. There are M +∆ other persons who went to B.
If Bob chooses to cheat, and decide to stay put, without
using a random number generator, the number of agents
switching would be a random number r˜, with a distribu-
tion given by
Prob′p(r˜) =
(
M +∆
r˜
)
pr˜(1− p)M+∆−r˜ (8)
He would be in the minority, if r˜ ≥ ∆ + 1. Thus,
if he chooses to stay, we have his expected payoff
EP (Bob|stay) given by
EP (Bob|stay) =
∞∑
r˜=∆+1
Prob′p(r˜) (9)
On the other hand, if Bob decide to switch his choice,
he would win if r˜ ≤ ∆ − 1. In that case, his expected
payoff EP (Bob|switch) is given by
EP (Bob|switch) =
∆−1∑
r˜=0
Prob′p(r˜) (10)
We choose the value of p to make these equal. Thus
the equation determining p, for a given ∆ and N is
EP (Bob|stay) = EP (Bob|switch) (11)
If the above condition is satisfied, Bob can choose to
stay, or switch, and his expected payoff is the same. More
generally, he can choose to switch with a probability α,
and his payoff is independent of α. In that case, what
is the optimum value of α for Bob? One has to bring in
a different optimization rule to decide this, and it seems
reasonable that Bob would choose a value that optimizes
his long-time average payoff, (which is the same for any
other agent), and hence choose the value p.
In the limit of M ≫ ∆, eq. (11) simplifies, as the de-
pendence on M drops out, and we get a simple equation
determining the dependence of the Poisson parameter λ
on ∆. Then, Eq. (11) becomes
∆−1∑
r=0
λr
r!
e−λ =
∞∑
r=∆+1
λr
r!
e−λ (12)
This equation may be rewritten, avoiding the infinite
summation, as
2
∆−1∑
r=0
λre−λ
r!
= 1− λ
∆e−λ
∆!
(13)
It is easy to see that Eq.(13) implies that Eq.(7) is also
satisfied. For the sake of simplicity, we will only consider
this limit of large M in the following. The extention to
finite M presents no special difficulties.
Thus, for any given value of ∆ > 0, the optimum value
of λ is determined by solution of Eq. (13). This equation
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FIG. 1: Variation of expected payoff for the next day of an
agent in Restaurant A (PAlice) and Restaurant B (PBob) with
∆.
is easily solved. The resulting values of λ for different
∆ are shown in Table I. For large ∆, we show in the
Appendix that (λ −∆) tends to 1/6.
We note that the values of λ do not have to be broad-
cast to the agents by any central authority. Each in-
dividual rational agents will be able to deduce them as
optimal, without any need to communicate with others.
Fig. 1 shows the variation of the expected payoff for the
next day of Alice and Bob with ∆. As expected we can
see that for large values of ∆, the expected payoff of an
agent in either restaurant tend to the value 1/2. Alice’s
payoff is a bit bigger than 1/2, but this advantage is
short-lived. Also, Bob cannot utilize this predictability
of the system, as an attempt to switch by him change the
outcome with finite probability.
TABLE I:
∆ λ ∆ λ
1 1.14619 8 8.16393
2 2.15592 9 9.16423
3 3.15942 10 10.16448
4 4.16121 20 20.16557
5 5.16229 30 30.16594
6 6.16302 40 40.16612
7 7.16354 50 50.16623
Now, we consider the case ∆ = 0. In this case, restau-
rant A has exactly M , and B has M +1 people. We now
show that there is no optimum value of λ in this case.
A naive extention of the strategy for ∆ > 0 to this
case would be that Alice does not switch. But then, if
there is a nonzero λ, and agents from B switch to A, Bob
has an incentive to cheat, as if he goes to A, he would be
sure to be in the majority. If he cheats, and stays back,
but at least one other people leave from B to A ( which
occurs with nonzero probability for any non-zero λ), he
has some chance to be on the winning side.
Clearly, λ = 0 is not a viable strategy, as then nobody
switches, and the state at day (t + 1) is same as on day
t. And same situation is met again. While this is a
solution which minimizes wastage of resources, and is
‘socially efficient’, this is clearly a very unfair state of
affairs, where a subset of people are privileged, and have
payoff 1 every day, and another set has no chance of any
payoff.
Consider the possible strategy that in this case, all peo-
ple who went to A switch with probability λ′/M , and all
who went to B switch with probability λ′′/(M +1), with
both λ′ and λ′′ non-zero. Let r′ and r′′ be the random
variables denoting the number of people switching sides
from A to B, and from B to A respectively. Then, r′ and
r′′ are Poisson-distributed independent random variables
with mean λ′ and λ” respectively. Repeating the anal-
ysis above, we see that the condition that Alice has no
incentive to cheat gives the condition
Prob(r′ < r′′ − 2) = Prob(r′ ≥ r′′) (14)
Similarly, for the absence of incentive to cheat for Bob,
we should have
Prob(r′ < r′′ − 1) = Prob(r′ ≥ r′′ + 1) (15)
It is easy to see that Eq. (14) and Eq. (15) are mutu-
ally inconsistent, as the LHS of the former is strictly less
than the LHS of the latter, and for RHS it is the oppo-
site. Thus, we cannot find nonzero finite values λ′ and
λ′′, which will give a stable strategy against individuals
cheating.
Thus, if we reach ∆ = 0, it is not clear what any agent
should do. We note that in this case, though Bob does
not expect to gain anything on the next day by switching,
he would still like to do that to upset the status quo, and
improve his chance of winning the day after. Of course,
as Alice realizes that some people from B are likely to
switch, she would like to switch as well. A simple strategy
is that in this case, all agents irrespective of whether they
were in minority or not on day t, switch the next day with
a proability M ǫ−1, where ǫ is a real number 0 ≤ ǫ ≤ 1.
This corresponds to both λ′ and λ′′ very large, of order
M ǫ. We shall refer to this step as a major resetting event.
For a given value of ǫ, the value of |∆| just after
resetting is of order M ǫ/2. Then it lakes time of or-
der log logM to reach the value ∆ = 0. Then the
maximum contribution to the mean efficiency parame-
ter comes from the major resetting events, and it is easy
to see that the mean inefficiency parameter would vary
as M ǫ−1/ log logM . Then, for more efficiency, we should
keep ǫ small.
IV. MONTE CARLO SIMULATIONS
We have studied the time evolution of a set ofN agents
using this strategy using Monte Carlo simulations, with
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FIG. 2: A typical evolution of a system of 2001 agents for
two different choices of the parameter ǫ = 0.5 and 0.7. The
large deviations correspond to major events (see text).
N = 2001. If the restaurant with greater attendance has
M + 1 + ∆ agents on a given day, with ∆ > 0, the next
day each of them switches his/her choice with probabil-
ity λ(∆)/(M + ∆ + 1), and the agents in the minority
restaurant stick to their choice. If there are exactlyM+1
agents in the majority restaurant, all agents switch their
restaurant with a probability 1/(2M1−ǫ).
The result of a typical evolution is shown in Fig. 2, for
two choices of ǫ: 0.5 and 0.7. We see that the majority
restaurant changes quite frequently. The large peaks in
|∆| correspond to resettings of the system, and clearly,
their magnitude decreases if ǫ is decreased. There is very
little memory of the location of majority restaurant in
the system. To be specific, let S(t) is +1 if the minority
restaurant is A in the t-th step, and −1 if it is B. Then
the autocorrelation function 〈S(t)S(t+ τ)〉 decays expo-
nentially with τ , approximately as exp(−Kτ). The value
of K depends on ǫ, but is about 2, and the correlation is
negligible for τ > 3.
Fig. 3 shows the probability distribution of ∆ in the
steady state for two different values of ǫ. Fig. 4 gives
a plot of the inefficiency parameter η as a function of
ǫ. In each case, the estimate of η was obtained using a
single evolution of the system for 10000 time steps. The
fractional error of estimate is less than the size of symbols
used.
We define Ai(t) equal to +1 if the i-th agent was in the
restaurant A at time t, and −1 otherwise. We define the
auto-correlation function of the A-variables in the steady
state as
C(τ) =
1
N
∑
i
〈Ai(t)Ai(t+ τ)〉 (16)
In Fig. 5, we have shown the variation of C(τ) with τ .
We see that this function has a large amount of persis-
tence. This is related to the fact that only a small fraction
of agents actually switch their choice at any time step.
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FIG. 3: Probability distribution of ∆ in the steady state for
ǫ = .3, .7 obtained by evolving N = 2001 agents for 106 time
steps. The red bars have been shifted a bit to the right for
visual clarity.
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Clearly, the persistence time is larger for smaller ǫ.
V. DISCUSSION
In our analysis of the strategy discussed, we assumed
that whenever the system reaches a state in which one
restaurant has exactly M agents, it is not possible to
find a strategy for reaching a nearby state, with only a
few agents switching, and the system undergoes a major
resetting. However, consider a situation where because of
shared common history, the agents agree to a convention
that if such a state is reached, it continues for T more
days without change, as it is socially efficient, and on the
(T +1)-th day, the major resetting occurs. The rationale
for such a choice would be that all agents recognize that
this state has overall maximum social benefit, and in the
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FIG. 5: C(τ ) as a function of τ for ǫ = .3, .5 and .7. Each
data point is obtained by averaging over 10000 simulation
steps.Total number of agents is N = 2001.
long run, any agent would spend equal amount of time
in the privileged class. Clearly, for realistic modelling, T
should not be too large. It has to be significantly less
than the expected lifetime of an agent.
The number of consecutive days when ∆ is nonzero
is of order log logN , and then for T consecutive days ∆
remains zero. Then, the volatility η in such a strategy is
given by
η ≃ K1N
ǫ−1
T +K2 log logN
(17)
where K1 and K2 are some constants.
This conclusion is not very surprising. A society that
has a larger value of T has more overall social benefit
than one with a shorter value. However, agents have to
look for something other than payoff on the next day to
realize this, and one needs to go beyond myopic strategies
that maximize the payoff on the next day. An interesting
question is what strategies would emerge if the agents try
to maximize the sum of their expected payoffs in the next
n days for n > 1.
Generalization of this strategy to the Kolkata Paise
Restaurant problem is straight forward. The strategy
is as follows: If an agent was fed at restaurant of rank
k at time step t, he goes to restaurant of rank k − 1
at time t + 1. If he found no food at time step t, He
picks at random one restaurant, out of the restaurants
that had no customer at step t. If the picked restaurant
has rank k′, he goes to the restaurant with rank k′ − 1.
Then, the average time required to reach a cyclic state
is of order logN . And in the cyclic state, each agent
gets to sample all the restaurants. The strategy can be
made robust against cheaters, if we make the additional
rule that if more than one customer shows up at the
restaurant of rank k, preference is given to the customer
who was served at rank (k + 1) restaurant the previous
day.
An interesting question is the effect of heterogeneity
in agents, as far as the value of ǫ is concerned. There
may be impatient agents that do not want to wait, and
switch with probability 1/2 as soon as the value ∆ = 0 is
reached. If the number of such agents is Na, with a < 1,
it is easy to see that the final efficiency parameter can not
be less than Na−1. In order to get substantial decease in
inefficiency, the number of such agents should be small.
The optimum value of T , or of the parameter ǫ is
not decidable within the framework of our model, as
one needs to bring in other criteria like fairness or so-
cial equality, and decide the relative weights of these and
social efficiency and the wish to have the next win quickly
to determine the optimum choice. Also their have to be
some general shared values amongst the agents to make
this possible. Clearly, a discussion of these issues is be-
yond the scope of our work.
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Appendix
In this Appendix, we discuss the solution of the equa-
tion (12)
∆−1∑
r=0
fλ(r) =
∞∑
r=∆+1
fλ(r) (A.1)
where fλ(r) = λ
r exp(−λ)/Γ(r+1), for r not necessarily
integer. We want to solve for λ, when ∆ is given to be
a large positive integer. We want to show in the limit of
large ∆, λ−∆ tends to 1/6.
For large λ, the Poisson distribution tends to a gaus-
sian centered at λ, of variance λ. If the distribution for
large λ were fully symmetric about the mean, the solu-
tion to the above equation would be λ = ∆. The fact
that difference between these remains finite is due to the
residual asymmetry in the Poisson distribution, for large
λ.
For large λ, fλ(r) is a slowly varying function of its
argument. We add f(∆)/2 to both sides of eq. (12), and
approximate the summation by an integration. Then,
the eq. (12) can be approximated by
∫ ∆
0
fλ(r)dr =
∫ +∞
∆
fλ(r)dr = 1/2 (A.2)
We have used the trapezoid rule
[f(r) + f(r + 1)] /2 ≈
∫ r+1
r
dr′f(r′), (A.3)
It can be shown that the discrepancy between Eqs. (12)
and (A.2) is at most of order (1/λ).
7Then, for large λ, deviations of fλ(r) from the limiting
gaussian form can be expanded in inverse half-integer
powers of λ
fλ(r) =
1√
λ
φ0(x) +
1
λ
φ1(x) + . . . . (A.4)
where x is a scaling variable defined by x = (r − λ)/
√
λ.
Here φ0(x) is the asymptotic gaussian part of the distri-
bution, as expected from the central limit theorem, and
φ1(x) describes the first correction term.
The characteristic function for the Poisson distribution
Φ˜λ(k) defined by
Φ˜λ(k) = 〈eikr〉 =
∞∑
r=0
eikrProbλ(r) = exp
[
λeik − λ]
= exp
[
ikλ− k2λ/2− ik3λ/6 + ..] (A.5)
Keeping the terms up to quadratic in k gives the
asymptotic gaussian form of the central limit theorem
φ0(x) =
1√
2π
exp(−x2/2). (A.6)
The first order correction to this asymptotic form of
Φ˜λ(k) is given by
φ˜1(k) =
−ik3
6
exp(−k2/2) (A.7)
which gives on taking inverse Fourier transforms
φ1(x) =
1
6
d3
dx3
φ0(x) (A.8)
Substituting the functional forms for φ0(x) and φ1(x)
in Eq. (A.2), we get
∫ ∆−λ√
λ
−∞
dx
[
φ0(x) +
1√
λ
φ1(x)
]
= 1/2. (A.9)
Now, φ1(x) is an odd function of x, and is zero for
x = 0. As ∆ − λ is small, in the coefficient of 1/
√
λ, we
can replace the upper limit of the integral by zero. Thus
we write
∫ (∆−λ)/√λ
−∞
φ1(x
′)dx′ ≈
∫ 0
−∞
φ1(x
′)dx′ (A.10)
But using eq. (A.8), we get
∫ 0
−∞
φ1(x
′)dx′ =
1
6
d2
dx2
φ0(x)|x=0 = −φ0(0)/6 (A.11)
Substituting in eq. (A.10), we get
∫ (∆−λ)/√λ
−∞
φ0(x
′)dx′ = 1/2− φ0(0)
6
√
λ
+O(1/λ) (A.12)
and comparing terms of order λ−1/2 we get
λ−∆ = 1/6 +O( 1√
λ
). (A.13)
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